The Delhi High Court has set aside a Family Court judgment and granted a decree of divorce to a husband on the grounds of cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (HMA). The Division Bench of Justice Anil Kshetarpal and Justice Renu Bhatnagar ruled that the principle of “clean hands” cannot be invoked to deny relief to a petitioner who has successfully proved cruelty, merely based on unsubstantiated counter-allegations by the respondent.
Summary of Legal Issue and Outcome
The core legal question before the Division Bench was whether the Family Court erred in concluding that cruelty was not proved and whether it correctly invoked the principle that a party must approach the Court with “clean hands” to deny relief. The High Court held that Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA, which embodies the “clean hands” doctrine, is intended to prevent a party from taking advantage of their own wrong but does not empower a court to reject relief when the statutory ground for divorce is otherwise established and the petitioner has not committed a matrimonial offence contributing to the breakdown. Consequently, the Court allowed the appeal and dissolved the marriage.
Background of the Case
The appellant (husband) and the respondent (wife) were married on March 1, 2016, according to Hindu rites. Due to marital discord, the appellant filed for divorce (HMA No. 300/2021) on March 24, 2021. He alleged that the respondent subjected him to mental cruelty through a series of acts, including:
- Disclosing on December 16, 2016, that the marriage was against her will.
- Threatening suicide on July 17, 2017, when her demand to live separately from the appellant’s aged parents was resisted.
- Demanding a new house in her name and throwing a cup of tea at the appellant on August 18, 2018.
- Repeatedly abusing the appellant’s mother by calling her “langdi” and threatening to leave the home.
- Refusing physical relations since October 10, 2019.
- Leaving the matrimonial home on January 17, 2020, and refusing to return.
The Family Court, via a judgment dated March 20, 2025, dismissed the petition. It reasoned that the appellant had failed to prove cruelty and held he was disentitled to relief for approaching the court with “unclean hands,” as he had not satisfactorily rebutted the respondent’s allegations of dowry demands.
Arguments of the Parties
The Appellant’s Contentions: Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the Family Court failed to appreciate the “uncontroverted and consistent evidence” demonstrating a sustained pattern of mental cruelty. He submitted that the trial court erred in isolating incidents rather than viewing their cumulative effect on the appellant’s mental peace.
Regarding the “clean hands” finding, the appellant contended that mere allegations of dowry demand in the written statement, without independent evidence, could not taint his claim. He emphasized that no criminal case was pending at the time of filing the divorce petition.
The Respondent’s Contentions: The respondent supported the impugned judgment, arguing that the appellant sought divorce to evade his own misconduct. She alleged she was subjected to harassment for dowry and cited an attempt by the appellant’s father to outrage her modesty as the reason for leaving the matrimonial home. Her counsel argued that the absence of cross-examination on material aspects of her testimony justified the inference that the appellant’s case lacked bona fides.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
1. On Mental Cruelty The High Court observed that the term “treated the petitioner with cruelty” is not defined in the statute but has been interpreted by the Supreme Court in cases like V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat and Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh to include conduct causing mental pain that makes living together impossible.
The Bench noted that the appellant’s testimony regarding verbal abuse, threats of suicide, and withdrawal from cohabitation remained “consistent and largely unshaken in cross-examination.” The Court criticized the Family Court’s approach, stating:
“The Family Court’s approach of assessing each incident in isolation rather than cumulatively was contrary to the settled legal position in Samar Ghosh.”
2. On Unsubstantiated Criminal Allegations The Court found the respondent’s allegations of dowry demand and molestation to be devoid of contemporaneous support. It highlighted that the FIR and Section 125 CrPC proceedings were initiated only after the divorce petition was filed. Citing A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, the Court observed:
“The post-litigation initiation of criminal proceedings strongly indicates that the allegations were reactive, embellished, or incomplete… unsubstantiated, belated, or exaggerated accusations… may themselves constitute mental cruelty.”
3. On Allegations Against In-Laws Addressing the respondent’s serious allegation against the appellant’s father, the Court held:
“It is also significant that the Respondent herself has alleged attempted molestation by her father-in-law. Even assuming such an allegation to be true for the sake of argument, cohabitation thereafter becomes virtually impossible… once a spouse levels allegations of sexual impropriety against close relatives of the other party, the possibility of restoration of matrimonial harmony is effectively extinguished.”
4. On the ‘Clean Hands’ Doctrine The Court ruled that Section 23(1)(a) of the HMA applies only when the petitioner’s conduct constitutes a matrimonial offence. The Bench held that the withdrawal of the appellant’s father as a witness did not amount to a suppression of material facts.
“The Family Court’s conclusion that the Appellant approached the Court with unclean hands, therefore, rests on conjecture rather than proof.”
Decision
The High Court concluded that the marriage had “irretrievably broken down” and that compelling the parties to remain tied to the union would only perpetuate mental agony.
The Bench held:
“The dissolution of marriage is not a triumph of one over the other, but a legal recognition that the relationship has reached a point of no return.”
The appeal was allowed, and the Impugned Judgment and Decree dated March 20, 2025, was set aside. The marriage between the parties was dissolved by a decree of divorce under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
