Burden of Proof in Execution Rests Squarely on Decree-Holder: Supreme Court in Century-Old Religious Dispute

The Supreme Court of India has dismissed appeals related to a nearly century-old dispute between two community sects in Andhra Pradesh, holding that an executing court cannot order the execution of a decree “on mere presumption without any proof.”

In a judgment delivered on November 11, 2025, a bench of Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Vipul M. Pancholi upheld a 2012 Andhra Pradesh High Court decision. The apex court affirmed that the appellants (decree-holders) had failed to discharge the “primary onus” of proving that the respondents (judgment-debtors) had violated the terms of a compromise decree dating back to 1933.

The legal issue centered on the executability of this 1933 compromise decree, which governed the custody of idols and the performance of religious rituals for the deity Lord Sangalappa Swamy, worshipped by both groups. The Supreme Court concluded that the appellants failed to provide any “convincing evidence” of a violation, rendering their execution petition unsustainable on facts.

Background of the Dispute

The judgment in Kapadam Sangalappa and Others v. Kamatam Sangalappa and Others (Civil Appeal Nos. 281-282 of 2015) addresses a “long-standing and deeply rooted dispute” between the Kapadam families of Gungulakunta (appellants) and the Kamatam families of Yerrayapalli (respondents), both sections of the Kuruba community in Anantapur District.

The litigation traces back to O.S. No. 486 of 1927, filed by the Kamatam families for custody of pooja articles, which was dismissed. A subsequent representative suit (O.S. No. 15 of 1933) resulted in a compromise decree on November 1, 1933.

The 1933 decree stipulated:

1. The appellants, who were then performing pooja, would continue to do so. The respondents could gain the right to perform pooja only after paying Rs. 2,000/- for their half-share of expenses, failing which they would “lose their right.”
2. Both sects would appoint two trustees each to supervise rituals and maintain accounts. The idols were to be installed alternately for six months at each village, with pooja rights rotating every three months.

The dispute re-emerged in 1999 when the appellants alleged the respondents refused to rotate the idols. Consequently, the appellants filed Execution Petition No. 59 of 2000 to enforce the 1933 decree.

The Executing Court (Principal Senior Civil Judge, Anantapur) allowed the petition on September 13, 2005, and ordered the return of the idols. However, the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, in Civil Revision Petition No. 5224 of 2005, set aside this order on January 6, 2012. The High Court held that while the execution petition was maintainable and not barred by limitation, there was “no proof presented by the appellants that the respondents had violated the terms of the compromise decree.” A review was also dismissed, leading the appellants to the Supreme Court.

Arguments of the Parties

Shri Gaurav Agrawal, learned senior counsel for the appellants, argued that the High Court had erred in interfering with the Executing Court’s finding of fact. He “vehemently argued that the deity items were sacred and it is impossible to believe that the respondents made replica of those idols and were worshipping the same.” He further submitted that the appellants would not have filed an execution petition if they were already in possession of the idols.

Per contra, Shri Gagan Gupta, learned senior counsel for the respondents, argued that the execution petition “lacked factual foundation.” He contended there was no evidence the respondents were in possession of the idols or had violated the decree. He submitted that the respondents had never fulfilled the condition of paying Rs. 2,000/-, and thus, “there never existed any enforceable obligation upon the respondents.” The respondents’ counsel argued the decree was “never acted upon” and both parties had since set up their own idols.

Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings

The Supreme Court bench, in its analysis penned by Justice Mishra, framed the “only short question” for consideration as “whether the compromise decree dated 01.11.1933 was capable of execution on the facts and whether the respondents had in fact violated its terms.”

The Court found the Executing Court’s order was based on flawed reasoning. The judgment noted, “On scrutiny of the judgment passed by the Executing Court, we find that there was no convincing evidence before the Executing Court to establish that the respondents were in possession of the idols or had violated the compromise decree.”

The Supreme Court observed that the Executing Court “appears to have assumed” the arrangement was working simply because no dispute was raised for decades. The Court declared such an inference “impermissible” and stated, “Findings based on presumption cannot replace proof.” The testimonies of the witnesses (who were not parties to the original 1933 suit) were described as “bare assertions, unsupported by any independent witnesses or documentary proof.”

Crucially, the Court analyzed the terms of the 1933 decree:

1. On Possession: Clause (1) of the 1933 decree indicated the appellants were in possession at that time. The Court found this created a “presumption… that possession of the idols then was with the appellants.”
2. On Burden of Proof: The Court reiterated a “trite law that in execution petition, the primary onus lies on the decree-holder to show that the judgment debtor has willfully disobeyed the conditions of the decree.” The Court found that “no evidence has been led by the appellants to show that possession of the idols ever passed to the respondents.”
3. On Non-Compliance: The Court highlighted the appellants’ failure to prove the decree was ever acted upon. The appellants’ witness (PW-1) admitted he was “not aware of the payment of Rs.2,000/- to his ancestors, if any.” This admission made the respondents’ claim—that the decree was never acted upon and the idols remained with the appellants—”highly probable.”
4. On Clause (2): The Court noted there was “no evidence of compliance” with Clause (2) regarding the appointment of trustees or maintenance of accounts. “When any fact is especially within the knowledge of any person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him and no one else,” the Court observed, finding the appellants had produced no material on this point.

Concluding its analysis, the Court held: “In this regard, having reviewed the entire material on record, we are of the view that the appellants had failed to establish violation of the compromise decree by the respondents. The burden of proving violation of the decree rests squarely on the decree-holders. In the absence of cogent proof of such violation, the execution cannot be sustained.”

The Decision

The Supreme Court found that the Executing Court “fell into an error in allowing the execution of the compromise decree dated 01.11.1933 on mere presumption without any proof and the High Court rightly set aside the Executing Court’s order.”

“Consequently, we find absolutely no reason to interfere with the impugned judgments passed by the High Court,” the bench ruled, dismissing the appeals.