The Allahabad High Court, comprising Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Kshitij Shailendra, has condoned a 154-day delay in the filing of a commercial appeal, observing that it would be unjust to discard a challenge to an order on grounds of delay when an appeal against an identical order between the same parties has been filed within the limitation period. The court allowed the delay condonation application filed by M/s Jay Chemical Works in its appeal against an order of the Commercial Court, Kanpur Nagar.
Background of the Case
The appeal, filed under Section 13(1-A) of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015, was directed against an order dated September 19, 2024, by the Commercial Court, Kanpur Nagar. The lower court, exercising its powers under Order VII Rule 10 of the Civil Procedure Code, had directed the return of the plaint in Commercial Suit No. 3 of 2020, filed by M/s Jay Chemical Works (appellant) against M/s Sai Chemicals (respondent).
The appeal was filed in April 2025, which was reported to be delayed by 154 days. The appellant filed an application seeking condonation of this delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
Appellant’s Submissions for Condonation
In the affidavit supporting the application, the appellant, M/s Jay Chemical Works, attributed the delay to the serious illness of its proprietor, Mr. Jay Kumar. It was stated that the proprietor was under treatment for uneasiness and stomach disorder, which affected the business and his ability to keep track of the case. The appellant further claimed that their local counsel did not inform them about the passing of the impugned order.
According to the appellant, the proprietor engaged a new counsel in February-March 2025. Upon inquiry, the new counsel discovered that while two other matters were pending, the present case had already been decided on September 19, 2024. The appeal was then filed based on legal advice from the new counsel.
Senior Counsel Govind Singh, appearing for the appellant, argued that the delay was on account of genuine physical ailments, supported by medical evidence. He also pointed out that the Commercial Court had passed an identical order on March 29, 2025, in another suit (Commercial Suit No. 31 of 2023) between the same parties, and the appeal against that order (Commercial Appeal No. 18 of 2025) had been filed within the prescribed time limit and was already connected with the present appeal. He cited the Supreme Court’s decision in Ummer Vs. Pottengal Subida and others: (2018) 15 SCC 127, to argue for a liberal interpretation of “sufficient cause.”
Respondent’s Opposition
Counsel for the respondent, M/s Sai Chemicals, vehemently opposed the application, contending that the appellant had made misleading statements. It was submitted that the appellant’s proprietor had made regular appearances and even filed an affidavit dated January 10, 2025, in another suit (O.S. No. 31 of 2023) before the same Commercial Court after the impugned order was passed. This, the respondent argued, contradicted the plea of illness and lack of knowledge.
The respondent further argued that the new counsel was engaged in January 2025, and the limitation period of 60 days would have lapsed on March 10, 2025. Filing the appeal in April 2025 indicated that the grounds for delay were “cooked up.” The respondent placed reliance on the Supreme Court’s judgment in Jharkhand Urja Nigam Ltd. and another Vs. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited, decided on April 15, 2025.
Court’s Analysis and Findings
The High Court bench analyzed the submissions and legal precedents. The court noted the Supreme Court’s observation in Ummer (supra) that the view requiring a litigant to explain the delay of each day is no longer good law and that “sufficient cause” should be liberally construed.
The bench distinguished the case of Jharkhand Urja Nigam Ltd., pointing to the Supreme Court’s decision in Government of Maharashtra Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Pvt. Ltd.: (2021) 6 SCC 460. The court reiterated the principle from Borse Brothers that “the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done,” and its determination depends on the facts of each case with no “straitjacket formula.”
The court found several factors to be significant in the present case. It observed: “…it does not appear to be justified that, in one matter, validity of the order returning the plaint is examined on merits and, in another matter, challenge laid to exactly an identical order on identical grounds is discarded only on account of delay having occurred in filing the appeal.”
The court also found the appellant’s explanation regarding the discovery of the order by a newly engaged counsel to be “cogent and worth believing.” It held that the medical reports could not be ignored or deemed “utterly false” without specific denial supported by material. Furthermore, the bench stated, “mere filing of affidavit dated 10.01.2025 in another suit…though before the same Court, is, in itself, not sufficient to form a conclusive opinion regarding previous knowledge of passing of order in different suit.”
Decision
Concluding its analysis, the court held that the combination of the proprietor’s illness supported by medical evidence, the plausible explanation of how the order came to light, and the “very significant aspect that identical order returning the plaint has been challenged in the connected appeal which is well within time,” constituted a sufficient and satisfactory cause for the delay.
The court allowed the application and condoned the 154-day delay.
