The Allahabad High Court has quashed a termination order issued to an employee 22 years after he was appointed on compassionate grounds, ruling that an appointment cannot be annulled after an inordinate delay on the ground of non-disclosure of a fact, especially when there is no evidence of fraud or misrepresentation.
In a judgment delivered on August 5, 2025, Justice Manju Rani Chauhan, held that the responsibility to verify the particulars of a candidate for compassionate appointment rests with the employer. The court directed the reinstatement of the petitioner, Shiv Kumar, with all consequential benefits, setting aside the termination order passed by the District Basic Education Officer, Hathras.
The core legal issue before the court was whether a compassionate appointment, granted in 2001, could be terminated in 2023 on the allegation that the employee had concealed the fact that his mother was already in government service at the time of his application.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Shiv Kumar, sought compassionate appointment following the death of his father, an Assistant Teacher, on January 2, 1998. His application was submitted on May 17, 2000. After an inquiry by the District Basic Education Officer, Hathras, he was appointed as a Junior Clerk on July 12, 2001.
Over the years, the petitioner performed his duties satisfactorily, earning a promotion to Senior Clerk in 2006 and receiving benefits under the Assured Career Progression (A.C.P.) scheme.
The issue arose when an anonymous complaint was filed nearly 19 years after his appointment, alleging that the petitioner had secured the job by providing misleading information. This led to an inquiry, culminating in the termination order dated May 31, 2023. The sole ground for termination was the petitioner’s failure to disclose that his mother was employed as a government teacher at the time he applied for the compassionate appointment.
Arguments of the Petitioner
The petitioner’s counsel, Mr. Adarsh Singh, argued that there was no concealment of any material fact. He submitted that at the time of the application in 2000, there was no prescribed form requiring specific disclosures. Crucially, he pointed to a notarized affidavit dated July 28, 2000, submitted by the petitioner’s mother, wherein she had explicitly mentioned her employment as an Assistant Teacher in Prathmik Vidhyalay Bahrampur, Aligarh.
The counsel emphasized that the petitioner was merely 18 and a half years old at the time and could not be expected to understand the “technical niceties involved while moving an application for compassionate appointment.”
The petitioner relied on several judgments, including the case of Smt. Sugandha Upadhyay vs. State of U.P., where the court had held that it was “too late for the respondents to cancel the appointment… on the ground of the prohibition incorporated in Rule 5 and the employment status of her mother,” especially after ten years of service. This decision was upheld by a Division Bench and the Supreme Court.
It was further argued that non-disclosure of a fact not legally required to be disclosed does not amount to fraud. Citing S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu vs. Jagannath, the counsel submitted that fraud requires deliberate deception, which was absent in this case.
Arguments of the Respondents
The counsel for the State, Mr. Gaurav Bishan and Mr. Hare Ram, defended the termination, contending that the appointment was in direct violation of the Dying-in-Harness Rules, as per a Government Order dated September 4, 2000. Rule 5 of these rules prohibits compassionate appointment if the spouse of the deceased employee is already in government service.
The respondents argued that the petitioner secured the appointment by concealing this material fact, rendering the appointment illegal. They alleged that neither the petitioner nor his family members revealed the mother’s employment status in the no-objection affidavits.
The State’s counsel relied on the Supreme Court’s observation in R. Vishwanatha Pillai v. State of Kerala, which held that a person who obtains a post by fraud cannot be said to be holding a post within the meaning of Article 311 of the Constitution. They argued that fraud vitiates all proceedings, and therefore, a full-fledged disciplinary inquiry was not necessary before termination.
Court’s Analysis and Decision
After hearing both parties, Hon’ble Mrs. Manju Rani Chauhan, J., found merit in the petitioner’s case. The court concluded that there was “neither any misrepresentation nor concealment on the part of the petitioner.”
The court observed that the petitioner’s mother was employed in the same department, and it was incumbent upon the authorities to conduct due diligence. The judgment noted, “If the authorities themselves failed to conduct due diligence and verify facts that were otherwise apparent from the record, the petitioner cannot be held liable for any alleged non-disclosure.”
The court gave significant weight to the petitioner’s “tender age” at the time of application and the family’s emotional distress. It held that the burden to scrutinize family particulars “rests squarely upon the respondents.”
The judgment made a clear distinction between an ‘irregular’ appointment and one obtained through fraud. The court found that the petitioner’s appointment was not illegal or void. It stated, “In the present case, it is evident from the record that the petitioner did not indulge in any act of concealment or misrepresentation at the time of seeking appointment. All relevant documents were submitted and duly scrutinized by the competent authority before the appointment was offered.”
The court strongly deprecated the authorities’ action after an “inordinate delay.” It observed, “Once it is established that there was no concealment of material facts by the petitioner at the time of his initial appointment, the respondents cannot, after a lapse of 14 years, seek to reopen the issue… Such action after an inordinate delay of 14 years, without any allegation of fraud or misrepresentation, would be arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice.”
Finding the termination order unsustainable, the court allowed the writ petition. The order dated May 31, 2023, was quashed, and the respondents were directed to reinstate the petitioner with all consequential benefits.
