The Bombay High Court has quashed an FIR filed against an advocate, emphasizing that an advocate following a client’s instructions to cast aspersions on another party’s character during judicial proceedings is not automatically guilty of insulting modesty. The court underlined that advocates have a duty to represent their clients’ interests and that allegations made in the course of such representation, if without malicious intent, do not constitute a criminal offense under Section 79 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), 2023.
The decision was delivered by a division bench comprising Justice Bharati Dangre and Justice Manjusha Deshpande in Criminal Writ Petition No. 3858 of 2024.
Background of the Case
The case arose from a remand hearing involving an accused person represented by the advocate. The accused was alleged to have defrauded investors through a business venture. During the hearing, the advocate referred to allegations from a prior complaint made by the accused’s family member, which accused another party in the case of leveraging a relationship with a police officer to intimidate and threaten the accused and their family.
A party to the case filed a complaint against the advocate, alleging that the statements made in court insulted her modesty by insinuating an illicit relationship. This led to the registration of FIR No. 455 of 2024 at Panvel City Police Station under Section 79 of the BNS.
Legal Issues
1. Privilege of Advocates:
The court examined whether an advocate could be held criminally liable for statements made in the course of judicial proceedings while representing a client.
2. Essence of Insulting Modesty:
Section 79 of the BNS, akin to Section 509 of the IPC, requires proof of intent to insult a woman’s modesty. The court deliberated whether such intent existed in this case.
3. Advocates’ Professional Duty:
The court analyzed whether the advocate’s statements, made based on client instructions, were protected under the privileges afforded to legal professionals.
Court’s Observations and Findings
The court quashed the FIR against the advocate, making several critical observations:
– Professional Privilege and Intent:
The bench noted that the advocate’s statements were based on instructions from the client and were directly connected to the judicial proceedings. The remarks, while potentially offensive to the complainant, lacked malice or intent to insult her modesty, as required under Section 79.
– Context of Judicial Proceedings:
The court emphasized that advocates are entitled to privileges while advancing their clients’ cases. It stated, “Casting aspersions upon an advocate without evidence of malice undermines the sanctity of their professional role in upholding justice.”
– Discrepancies in Complaints:
The court highlighted inconsistencies in the complainant’s narrative. Her initial application to the Magistrate, filed immediately after the incident, did not mention the defamatory remarks. These allegations surfaced only in her subsequent police complaint, raising doubts about their authenticity.
– Role of Intent in Insulting Modesty:
Referring to precedent, the court reiterated that the act of insulting modesty requires deliberate intent. It cited the principle that “a balance must be struck when construing the intention of the accused in cases of outraging modesty, ensuring justice is both fair and context-specific.”
– Advocate’s Duty vs. Malicious Conduct:
The bench clarified that an advocate cannot be penalized for statements made in the legitimate discharge of professional duties unless there is evidence of express malice or intent to harm.
Ruling
The court ruled that the allegations against the advocate were insufficient to establish intent to insult modesty. It stated that the statements were part of the advocate’s duty to defend the client and were grounded in the instructions received. The FIR, the court held, was an abuse of the legal process and was accordingly quashed.
