In a significant judgment interpreting the procedural interplay between the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (the 2013 Act) and the Limitation Act, 1963, the Supreme Court has held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, which empowers courts to condone delay, applies to appeals filed under Section 74 of the 2013 Act.
The Bench comprising Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma set aside various High Court judgments that had dismissed first appeals filed by the government authorities as being barred by limitation, holding that Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not expressly exclude the application of the Limitation Act. The Court emphasized that the 2013 Act, while being a special law, must be read in conjunction with the Limitation Act by virtue of Section 103, which states the provisions are “in addition to and not in derogation of” other laws.
Background of the Dispute
The judgment disposed of a batch of approximately 530 appeals, with the lead case being The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s S.V. Global Mill Limited. The High Courts had dismissed the appeals filed by the appellant authorities under Section 74 of the 2013 Act on the grounds of limitation. The High Courts reasoned that the 2013 Act is a self-contained code and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act could not be invoked to condone the delay beyond the period prescribed in Section 74.
The primary legal issue before the Apex Court was the interplay between Section 74 read with Section 103 of the 2013 Act, and Sections 5 and 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963. Additionally, the Court addressed an incidental issue regarding the applicability of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 versus the 2013 Act in cases where acquisition proceedings commenced under the 1894 Act, but the award was passed after the 2013 Act came into force.
Arguments of the Parties
For the Appellants: Learned Attorney General for India, Mr. R. Venkataramani, submitted that Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act mandates that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to special laws unless they are “expressly excluded.” He argued that Section 74 of the 2013 Act contains no such express exclusion. The appellants contended that a mere prescription of a limitation period, however peremptory, is insufficient to displace the applicability of Section 5. They further relied on Section 103 of the 2013 Act, which explicitly states that the Act’s provisions are “in addition to and not in derogation of” any other law for the time being in force.
For the Respondents: The respondents argued that the 2013 Act is a comprehensive, self-contained code where “time is of the essence.” They submitted that Section 74 prescribes a specific limitation period of 60 days, extendable by a further 60 days, which implies a conscious exclusion of the unfettered power to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hukumdev Narain Yadav vs. Lalit Narain Mishra, they argued that the scheme of the special law necessarily excluded the Limitation Act.
Court’s Analysis and Observations
1. Applicability of the 2013 Act to Pending Proceedings (Section 24(1)(a))
On the incidental issue, the Court clarified the operation of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. The Bench held that in cases where land acquisition proceedings were initiated under the 1894 Act but no award had been made under Section 11 of that Act, “all provisions of the 2013 Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply.”
However, the Court made a crucial distinction regarding additional benefits:
“We clarify that there is no question of rehabilitation and resettlement under the 1894 Act and, hence, there is neither any duty to award it nor a right to claim it under Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act. A totally new benefit cannot be extended retrospectively in the absence of a statutory prescription.”
Consequently, for awards passed under Section 24(1)(a), the provisions of the 2013 Act regarding compensation apply, but rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements do not.
2. Interplay with the Limitation Act, 1963
The Court conducted an exhaustive analysis of Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, holding that compliance with it is “mandatory” and that Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act apply to special laws unless there is an “express exclusion.”
Regarding Section 74 of the 2013 Act, the Court observed:
“Section 74, along with its proviso, deals with only one period of limitation, which is 60 days. The proviso merely facilitates an appellant to file the appeal within a further period of 60 days which, in effect, brings the same within the fold of the initial 60 days.”
The Bench firmly rejected the notion that Section 74 excludes the Limitation Act:
“We do not find any express exclusion contained in Section 74 of the 2013 Act. The 2013 Act being a subsequent legislation, it is obvious that the Legislature was conscious not to take away the application of Sections 4 to 24 of the 1963 Act from its purview… We cannot introduce words that are not available in Section 74 through an imaginary interpretation in holding the existence of an express exclusion.”
3. Significance of Section 103
The Court placed heavy reliance on Section 103 of the 2013 Act to support its conclusion. The provision states that the Act is “in addition to and not in derogation of” existing laws.
“Any interpretation of Section 74 of the 2013 Act, barring the application of other enactments which would include the 1963 Act, would make Section 103 of the 2013 Act redundant and otiose… Thus, we hold that the 1963 Act applies to the 2013 Act.”
4. Judicial Criticism of Official Negligence
While allowing the appeals, the Court issued a stinging rebuke regarding the conduct of government officials in filing appeals.
“We deem it necessary to flag certain concerns as to how collusion takes place with the active connivance of the officials. The very appeals before us, approximately 530 in number, are classic examples of such official connivance… The repeated failure to pursue remedies within time cannot be brushed aside as mere negligence and calls for fixing responsibility on the erring officials.”
The Court noted that even if not collusion, there was “abject carelessness and indifference,” particularly when substantial public money was involved.
Decision
The Supreme Court set aside the impugned judgments of the High Courts and allowed the applications for condonation of delay. The Court issued the following key directions and conclusions:
- Section 24(1)(a) Scope: Applicable to cases where awards are passed after the commencement of the 2013 Act. Only provisions relating to the determination of compensation apply, not rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements.
- Appellate Jurisdiction: First appeals in such cases must be treated as appeals under Section 74 of the 2013 Act, not Section 54 of the 1894 Act.
- Limitation: Section 74 of the 2013 Act does not bar the application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
- Directions to High Courts: High Courts were directed to adjudicate the appeals on merits and to “avoid a pedantic approach as against a pragmatic one in dealing with the applications seeking condonation of delay.”
- Directions to State Governments: States must issue appropriate directions to officers to ensure appeals under Section 74 are filed within the time provided.
Case Details:
- Case Title: The Deputy Commissioner and Special Land Acquisition Officer v. M/s S.V. Global Mill Limited (and connected matters)
- Case No: Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 215-216 of 2023
- Bench: Justice M.M. Sundresh and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma
