The Allahabad High Court has dismissed a criminal revision petition seeking maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.), ruling that a woman who enters into a second marriage while her first marriage legally subsists is not entitled to maintenance. Justice Madan Pal Singh affirmed the Family Court’s decision, holding that long-term cohabitation does not confer the status of a legally wedded “wife” if the marriage is void ab initio due to a living spouse.
Background of the Case
The revisionist challenged the judgment and order dated February 12, 2024, passed by the Additional Principal Judge, Family Court, Kanpur Nagar, which rejected her application for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C..
The revisionist was originally married to her first husband on April 29, 1992, with whom she had two children. Following matrimonial discord, the parties lived separately. During this period, she came into contact with Opposite Party No. 2, an advocate practicing at the District Court, Unnao. The revisionist alleged that the opposite party advised her that her prior marriage could be dissolved through a notarized agreement and claimed to have dissolved his own earlier marriage in a similar manner.
Relying on this representation, the revisionist and Opposite Party No. 2 allegedly solemnized their marriage on June 30, 2009, and cohabited as husband and wife for nearly a decade. She claimed that her name was recorded as his wife in official documents, including her Aadhaar Card and Passport. However, she alleged that in March 2018, the opposite party deserted her and denied her entry into the matrimonial home, compelling her to file for maintenance.
Arguments of the Parties
The counsel for the revisionist argued that the rejection of the maintenance claim solely on the ground of maintainability was incorrect. It was submitted that the law under Section 125 Cr.P.C. recognizes relationships akin to marriage where parties have lived together for a considerable period. The counsel relied on the Supreme Court judgment in Badshah vs. Urmila Badshah Godse & Anr. (2014) to support the claim that strict proof of marriage is not required in such proceedings.
Conversely, the counsel for Opposite Party No. 2 submitted that the revisionist had never obtained a final decree of divorce from her first husband. Furthermore, it was admitted that Opposite Party No. 2 was also already married to his legally wedded wife and was residing with her and their children. The counsel argued that since the revisionist’s first marriage was still in existence, and Opposite Party No. 2 also had a living spouse, their alleged relationship was void and could not support a claim for maintenance.
Court’s Analysis
Justice Madan Pal Singh examined the material on record and found it established that the revisionist’s first marriage had never been legally dissolved. The court noted that a divorce petition instituted by her under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act had been dismissed in default, meaning her first marriage continued to subsist in law.
The Court observed that both parties were married to other individuals at the time of their alleged second marriage. Citing Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the Court stated that a marriage contracted during the lifetime of a spouse is void ab initio and cannot create the legal status of husband and wife.
Addressing the revisionist’s reliance on the Badshah judgment, the Court distinguished the facts, noting that in Badshah, maintenance was granted because the second wife was unaware of the husband’s first marriage and her own earlier marriage was dissolved. In the present case, the revisionist admitted her subsisting marriage and the lack of a divorce decree. The Court rejected the argument that a notarized deed of mutual divorce could confer legal status.
Reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Savitaben Somabhai Bhatiya vs. State of Gujarat (2005), which held that the term “wife” under Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be expanded to include a woman not legally married.
The Court observed:
“In law, even assuming a marriage ceremony was performed, the same would be void as the applicant’s earlier marital tie continued to subsist. Thus, she cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. based on a long standing relationship.”
The Court further remarked on the societal implications of such claims:
“If such a practice is permitted in society… the very object and sanctity of Section 125 Cr.P.C. would stand diluted and the institution of marriage would lose its legal and social integrity. Such a proposition neither aligns with the legislative intent nor with the ethical and cultural foundation of Hindu family law.”
Decision The High Court held that the revisionist does not fall within the ambit of a legally wedded wife for the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C.. Consequently, the Court found no error in the Family Court’s rejection of the application. The criminal revision was dismissed.
