The Allahabad High Court Division Bench comprising Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Kunal Ravi Singh has dismissed a batch of writ petitions seeking a mandamus for the time-bound disposal of arbitration proceedings under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956. The Court held that the remedy for delay in such statutory arbitrations lies exclusively with the “Court” defined under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, and not through the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
The primary legal issue before the Court was whether a writ of mandamus could be issued under Article 226 directing an arbitrator appointed under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956 (the Act, 1956) to conclude proceedings within a time-bound period. The Court examined the applicability of Section 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (the Arbitration Act, 1996) to such statutory arbitrations.
The Bench dismissed the writ petitions, ruling that the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad does not exercise “ordinary original civil jurisdiction” and thus does not fall within the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act, 1996. Consequently, the power to extend the mandate of an arbitrator or address delays rests with the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction.
Background of the Case
The leading petition was filed by Suryadev Pathak, a landowner whose land in District Gorakhpur was acquired for the widening of National Highway No. 24 (formerly NH-29E) under the Bharat Mala Scheme. Aggrieved by the compensation assessed by the Competent Authority, the petitioner filed a claim petition under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956, before the Arbitrator/District Magistrate, Gorakhpur, on May 17, 2023.
Despite the lapse of more than two years, the arbitration proceedings remained pending. The petitioner approached the High Court contending that the unexplained delay violated his rights under Articles 14, 21, and 300-A of the Constitution, seeking a direction for expeditious disposal. Several other connected petitions raised similar grievances regarding delays in statutory arbitration proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties
Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners: Represented by Vishveshwar Mani Tripathi, the petitioners argued that “speedy justice” is an integral part of Article 21. They contended that the delay caused financial hardship and that the High Court should intervene as no effective remedy was available. It was submitted that once arbitration was invoked, the Arbitrator had a statutory obligation to decide the claim within a reasonable time.
Submissions on Behalf of the Respondents (State and NHAI): The State respondents and NHAI, represented by counsels including Anuj Agrawal, Mahendra Pratap, Pranjal Mehrotra, and Rajesh Kumar Jaiswal, opposed the petitions. Relying on Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956, they argued that the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 1996 apply to such arbitrations.
They argued that Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, 1996, provides a complete mechanism for the extension of time. Citing Section 2(1)(e)(i), they submitted that the “Court” competent to extend the mandate is the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction. Since the Allahabad High Court does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction, it cannot exercise powers under Section 29A.
Reliance was placed on Supreme Court judgments in M/s Pandey & Co. Builders Pvt. Ltd. vs. State of Bihar, State of West Bengal vs. Associated Contractors, Chief Engineer (NH) PWD (Roads) vs. M/s BSC & C&C JV, and NHAI vs. Sayedabad Tea Co.
Court’s Analysis
Legislative Framework and Jurisdictional Bar The Court observed that Section 3G(6) of the Act, 1956, expressly incorporates the Arbitration Act, 1996, subject to the provisions of the former. Consequently, the timeline for making an award is governed by Section 29A of the Arbitration Act, 1996, which mandates that an award be made within twelve months, extendable by six months with consent.
The Bench noted that under Section 29A(4), if the award is not made within the specified period, the mandate terminates unless extended by the “Court.” Referring to Section 2(1)(e)(i), the Court held:
“The definition of ‘Court’ is exhaustive and does not include High Courts that do not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction. The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad admittedly does not exercise ordinary original civil jurisdiction. Therefore, this Court cannot take over or exercise the powers that the law has specifically given to the proper civil court.”
Expiry of Mandate and “Functus Officio” In the leading case, the Court found that the statutory period of eighteen months (12 months + 6 months) had expired. The Court held that the arbitrator had become functus officio.
“The issuance of a mandamus directing the arbitrator to decide the case within a time-bound period, when his mandate has already expired, would amount to extending the arbitrator’s mandate through the backdoor. This would be contrary to the express provisions of Section 29A(4) which vests such power exclusively in the competent civil court.”
Availability of Alternative Remedy The Court distinguished the Division Bench decision in Kotak Mahindra Bank Ltd. Vs. State of U.P. (2017) and relied on the Single Judge decision in Jai Bahadur Singh vs. State of U.P. (2019). The Bench clarified that whether the statutory period has expired or not, the remedy lies with the Civil Court.
“The Parliament intended that such matters should be dealt with by the competent civil court which would be in a better position to examine the factual aspects… If this Court entertains writ petitions under Article 226 and issue directions in arbitration matters falling within the exclusive domain of the civil court… it would amount to usurping the jurisdiction conferred by the statute upon the civil court.”
The Court also referred to the Bombay High Court judgment in Omanand Industries vs. Secretary to the Government of India, reiterating that the National Highways Act is a special statute that applies the Arbitration Act, and grievances regarding delay must be addressed under the latter.
Decision
The Division Bench dismissed all the writ petitions as not maintainable. The Court held:
- Arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the Act, 1956, is governed by the Arbitration Act, 1996.
- The Allahabad High Court does not fall within the definition of “Court” under Section 2(1)(e)(i) of the Arbitration Act, 1996.
- A writ of mandamus cannot be issued to extend the mandate of an arbitrator or direct expeditious disposal when a specific statutory remedy exists under Section 29A(4) before the competent Civil Court.
The Court granted liberty to the petitioners to approach the competent Civil Court under Section 29A(4) of the Arbitration Act, 1996, for appropriate orders, including the extension of the mandate or substitution of the arbitrator. It was clarified that the Civil Court shall decide such applications on their own merits without being influenced by the High Court’s order.
Case Details:
- Case Title: Suryadev Pathak vs. Union of India and 4 others (and connected matters)
- Case No.: WRIT-C No. 28215 of 2025
- Bench: Justice Mahesh Chandra Tripathi and Justice Kunal Ravi Singh
- Counsel for Petitioner: Vishveshwar Mani Tripathi
- Counsel for Respondents: A.S.G.I., Anuj Agrawal, C.S.C., Mahendra Pratap, Pranjal Mehrotra, Rajesh Kumar Jaiswal
- Citation: 2025:AHC:213712-DB
