The High Court of Delhi, in a judgment delivered on November 3, 2025, quashed an FIR for offences including rape and administering an intoxicating substance (Sections 376/328 IPC), holding that the complainant’s allegations were “riddled with flagrant inconsistencies” and bereft of corroborating evidence.
Justice Amit Mahajan, presiding over the petition (CRL.M.C. 483/2020) filed by the petitioner, ruled that continuing the criminal proceedings, which had been pending for half a decade, would constitute an “abuse of process of law” and a “miscarriage of justice.”
Background of the Case
The petition sought the quashing of FIR No. 460/2018, registered at Police Station Fatehpur Beri on October 31, 2018.
According to the prosecution’s case, Respondent No. 2 (the complainant) alleged she met the petitioner in May 2018. She claimed that in June 2018, he forcibly established physical relations and subsequently continued the sexual relationship on the pretext of marriage, even moving into her house. It was also alleged the petitioner took her entire salary, amounting to approximately Rs. 8 lakhs, and demanded a further Rs. 10 lakhs, threatening to make her photos and videos viral.
In her statement recorded under Section 164 of the CrPC, the complainant stated she met the petitioner at a club where he offered her money to talk. She alleged that on one occasion, the petitioner forced her to drink a cold drink, after which she felt dizzy, and he then “took Respondent No.2 to her room and raped her.” She also made allegations of unnatural sex. A chargesheet was filed for offences under Sections 376/328/506 of the IPC, and a supplementary chargesheet later added Section 377 (unnatural offences) of the IPC.
Submissions of the Parties
The learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the FIR was registered with “mala fide motive” and that the petitioner had “fallen prey to a honey trap.” It was submitted that the petitioner is a married man with two children, a fact known to the complainant, making a promise of marriage impossible. The petitioner’s counsel further contended that the complainant had a “tendency to level false allegations,” citing previous rape cases she had lodged which resulted in acquittals. One such judgment, it was argued, noted that the complainant was herself married, meaning the relationship between two married, consenting adults could not be based on a false promise of marriage.
The learned counsel for the complainant (Respondent No. 2) submitted that the FIR and chargesheet disclosed cognizable offences. It was argued that the petitioner’s contentions about the complainant’s marital status were wrong and misleading. The counsel maintained that the argument of a consensual relationship was a “matter of trial” and that “scandalous allegations” against the complainant’s character were irrelevant to the case.
High Court’s Analysis and Observations
Justice Mahajan began the analysis by noting that while the power to quash proceedings under Section 482 of the CrPC should be exercised cautiously, it can be invoked “if it is found that the continuance of criminal proceedings would be a clear abuse of process of law,” citing the precedent set in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal.
The Court observed that in cases of sexual assault, the prosecutrix’s statement holds “higher significance,” but it is not “gospel truth,” and corroboration can be sought if the statement is not “wholly reliable” (Ref. Nirmal Premkumar v. State).
While addressing the petitioner’s claims about the complainant’s character, the Court made a significant observation: “The character of a victim, no matter how blemished, cannot be weaponised against her to imply consent. Even a willing companion who accompanies a client in lieu of some consideration can be the victim of rape.”
However, the Court found it “cannot remain blind to the implausibility of the allegations as well as the manifest discrepancies in the versions of Respondent No.2.”
The judgment highlighted several “flagrant inconsistencies”:
- Timeline Discrepancy: The FIR and Section 164 statement claimed the parties met in 2018, but the MLC (Medico-Legal Case) recorded her stating she had known the petitioner for “two and a half years.”
- Date of First Incident: The Section 164 statement alleged the first incident of rape occurred in June 2018, whereas the chargesheet stated it took place in “March, 2018.” The Court noted this “skews the entire timeline.”
- Lack of Corroboration: The allegation of being drugged via a cold drink was absent from the initial complaint, and no independent witness was found. Similarly, for the Section 377 allegation, the complainant claimed treatment at “various” hospitals but named none, and “no corroborative evidence has been forthcoming.”
- No Supporting Material: The Court stated, “Apart from the statement of Respondent No.2, no corroborative material in the nature of photographs or videos or conversations reflecting blackmail were found to make out a prima facie case.”
Regarding the petitioner’s marital status, the Court found it “improbable that Respondent No.2 was ignorant of the marital relation of the petitioner, especially when as per Respondent No.2, the parties cohabitated for some time.” The Court also found it “peculiar” that while the complainant claimed to have good relations with the petitioner’s family, her statements were “abysmally bereft of particulars in relation to the identity of such family members.”
Citing the Supreme Court in Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, the High Court noted that a prolonged relationship “would be indicative of a consensual relationship rather than a relationship based on false promise of marriage.”
Concluding its analysis, the Court found that the complainant’s versions were “riddled with flagrant inconsistencies that go to root of the matter” and were “rendered brittle due to absence of any cogent corroborating evidence.”
Decision
Finding that the “totality of the circumstances” did not “give rise to grave suspicion against the accused petitioner for framing of charges,” the Court held that subjecting the petitioner to trial “would be miscarriage of justice.”
The judgment stated: “In view of the above, FIR No. 460/2018, including all consequential proceedings arising therefrom, is quashed.” The petition was accordingly allowed.
