The High Court of Delhi, in a recent judgment, set aside an order passed by a Rent Controller that had granted ‘leave to defend’ to the occupants of a property in an eviction suit.
Justice Saurabh Banerjee, presiding over the revision petition (RC.REV. 39/2024), held that the occupants, who were allegedly unlawful sub-tenants, had failed to raise any triable issue. The court noted that the original tenant had not contested the eviction petition, and the occupants were taking “mutually conflicting, self-contradictory and inherently destructive stands.” Consequently, the High Court passed an eviction order in favour of the petitioner-landlords.
Background of the Case
The petitioners (landlords, Ms Farheen Israil & Anr.) filed an eviction petition under Section 14(1)(e) of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (DRC Act) before the learned ARC-01, Tis Hazari Courts. They sought the eviction of respondent no. 1 (tenant, Ghulam Rasool Wani) and respondent nos. 2 to 8 (the current occupants) from the subject premises, identified as property bearing no. 745, Ground Floor, Phatak Dhobian, Farash Khana, Delhi.
The petitioners stated that their grandfather purchased the property via a registered Sale Deed dated 06.01.1947 and inducted the father of respondent no. 1 as a tenant. They claimed the father of respondent no. 1 later wrongly handed over possession to one Sh. Syed Daud Meer, whose family members (respondent nos. 2 to 8) were residing therein.
The eviction was sought on the grounds of a bona fide requirement, stating that the wife of petitioner no. 2 had undergone caesarean surgery and was advised to avoid stairs, requiring her to stay on the ground floor. They also contended that their current residence was in an uninhabitable/dilapidated condition and they had no other suitable alternative accommodation.
While summons was served upon the original tenant (respondent no. 1) by publication, he did not file any application seeking leave to defend.
However, respondent nos. 2 to 8 filed an application seeking leave to defend, disputing the petitioners’ status as landlords or owners. They alleged the 1947 Sale Deed pertained to a different property (no. 746) and claimed the petitioners’ mother had executed a receipt dated 10.07.1997 for Rs. 50,000 as part payment for the sale of the property, after which possession was given to the husband of respondent no. 2. They also disputed the bona fide requirement, alleging the petitioners had sufficient alternative accommodation.
Vide order dated 07.12.2023, the learned ARC allowed the application for leave to defend, holding that a triable issue had been raised. The petitioners challenged this order in the present revision petition before the High Court.
Arguments of the Parties
The learned counsel for the petitioners, Mr. Amit Dhalla, argued that the application for leave to defend filed by respondent nos. 2 to 8 was not maintainable, as they were “merely unauthorized occupant/ unlawful sub-tenants” and the original tenant (respondent no. 1) had never filed such an application. It was argued that the respondents had no standing to challenge the petitioners’ ownership.
The petitioners further contended that the ARC wrongly relied on the 1997 receipt, as a suit for specific performance based on that very receipt (Suit no. 347/1998) had already been dismissed on merits by a trial court on 22.01.2002, a dismissal that was upheld by the High Court in appeal (RFA 394/2003) on 06.01.2012.
Controverting these submissions, Md. Zaryab Jamal Rizvi, learned counsel for respondents 2 to 8, first challenged the maintainability of the revision petition itself, arguing the appropriate remedy was under Section 38 of the DRC Act. On merits, he submitted that the respondents had raised a substantial triable issue regarding the ownership of the subject premises and that the impugned order from the ARC was well-reasoned.
High Court’s Analysis and Findings
The High Court first addressed the preliminary objection regarding the maintainability of the revision petition. Relying on the Hon’ble Division Bench judgment in R.S. Bakshi v. H.K. Malhari and subsequent consistent rulings, Justice Banerjee held that the petition under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act was “very much maintainable” and rejected the respondents’ objection.
Landlord-Tenant Relationship: The Court noted it was undisputed that respondent no. 1 was the “actual/ original/ sole tenant” and he “never filed any application seeking leave to defend.” The Court observed that respondent nos. 2 to 8 were “allegedly only unauthorized occupant/ unlawful sub-tenants” and their application “was hardly of any relevant value/ meaning.” In light of these facts, the Court held, “In view thereof, the landlord-tenant relationship stood established.”
The judgment further observed that allowing these respondents to contest when the original tenant had not, “would defeat and frustrate the very intention and object of the enactment [Section 25B]” which is designed for “summary and speedy remedy.”
Respondents’ Conflicting Stands: The Court found that the ARC had granted leave primarily based on the 1997 receipt and the alleged discrepancy in the 1947 Sale Deed. Justice Banerjee observed that the respondents were “merrily trying to sail in two boats.” On one hand, they relied on the 1997 receipt from the petitioners’ mother (implying her ownership), and on the other, they disputed the petitioners’ ownership based on the 1947 Sale Deed.
The Court held: “The same cannot go hand in hand and the respondents cannot be allowed to take mutually conflicting, self-contradictory and inherently destructive stands. The aforesaid, has been completely ignored by the learned ARC.”
Adjudicated Receipt (Res Judicata): The High Court found that the respondents’ case regarding the 1997 receipt “falls flat” as the matter had “already been adjudicated against the husband of the respondent no.2” in the prior suit for specific performance, which was dismissed on merits and the appeal therefrom was also dismissed. The Court stated, “Strangely, though the same was very much within the knowledge of the learned ARC, the same has been overlooked… The respondents surely cannot be allowed to have a second bite at the same cherry.”
Bona Fide Requirement and Alternative Accommodation: The Court found that the petitioners had “sufficiently able to demonstrate” their ownership through the sale deed, mutation records, and Aadhar card.
On the bona fide requirement, the Court held that the petitioners’ case was “consistent” and supported by “sufficient proof” (medical report and photographs of the dilapidated accommodation).
Regarding the availability of alternative accommodation, the Court reiterated the settled law that “it is the prerogative of the landlord, based on his subjective assessment, to choose an accommodation that reasonably satisfy his requirement.” Citing Anil Bajaj & Anr. v. Vinod Ahuja and Akhileshwar Kumar v. Mustaqim, the judgment stated, “A landlord being the best judge of his needs cannot be thrusted with the opinion of the tenant or the Court.” The Court concluded that the ARC had “wrongly held” that a triable issue was raised on this aspect.
An argument of adverse possession raised by the respondents’ counsel at the hearing was dismissed by the Court as “self-implicating” and “another way for the respondents to have one more bite at the cherry.”
Revisional Jurisdiction: Finally, the Court affirmed its power under Section 25B(8) of the DRC Act. While not an appellate court, it stated that when “manifest errors” of “arbitrariness, perversity, illegality, impropriety or the like” are apparent on the record, “it becomes the bounden duty of this Court to invoke its powers under revisional jurisdiction,” citing Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Limited v. Dilbahar Singh.
Decision
Concluding that there was a “manifest error in the impugned order” and that the respondents “were unable to raise any triable issue,” the High Court allowed the petition and set aside the ARC’s order dated 07.12.2023.
An eviction order was passed in favour of the petitioners for the subject premises. However, in accordance with Section 14(7) of the DRC Act, the Court directed that the order for recovery of possession shall not be executed before the expiry of a six-month period from the date of the judgment.
