The Delhi High Court has upheld a Family Court’s decision to grant a divorce to an advocate on the grounds of cruelty, finding that his wife, a senior Indian Railway Traffic Service (IRTS) officer, subjected him to grave mental agony through sustained verbal abuse and by sending vile text messages questioning his legitimacy. A Division Bench of Justice Anil Khetarpal and Justice Harish Vaidyanathan Shankar also rejected the wife’s claim for permanent alimony, holding that as a financially independent Group ‘A’ government officer with a substantial income, she was not entitled to maintenance.
The High Court affirmed the Family Court’s findings, observing that the wife’s conduct, which included using derogatory epithets and making scandalous allegations against the husband and his mother, constituted cruelty under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Background of the Case
The marriage between the parties was solemnized on January 25, 2010. It was the second marriage for both the appellant-wife, an IRTS officer, and the respondent-husband, an advocate. The union was short-lived, with the parties separating on March 8, 2011, after which the husband filed for divorce, citing cruelty. No children were born from the marriage.
Arguments of the Parties
The husband (respondent) alleged that the wife consistently subjected him to cruelty. He claimed she habitually used profane language, such as “janwar”, “son of a bitch”, “haramzada”, and “kutta”, towards him. The central evidence he presented was a series of text messages sent by the wife. One message suggested he ascertain his “actual father,” while another cast a “vile insinuation against his mother.” A specific message dated June 27, 2011, read: “Now I realise why you resemble jethu (uncle). Yr character speaks of yr illegitimate origin. Goodbye.” He also cited an incident where the wife allegedly slapped him and consistently humiliated him in social and professional circles.
The wife (appellant) denied the allegations and made counter-claims of cruelty. She contended that the husband pressured her to misuse her official position, locked her inside their home on one occasion, and that she was harassed by him and his mother. She further argued that any acts of cruelty had been condoned, as the couple had cohabited between 2011 and 2013 after the divorce petition was filed. She also accused the husband of initiating frivolous and malicious legal proceedings to harass her.
The Court’s Analysis and Decision
The High Court, in its judgment dated October 17, 2025, conducted a detailed analysis of the evidence and legal principles surrounding mental cruelty. The Bench found no reason to interfere with the Family Court’s decision.
On the Finding of Cruelty:
The Court found the evidence of cruelty presented by the husband to be compelling and unequivocal. It placed significant weight on the text messages sent from the wife’s mobile number. The judgment stated, “These messages, which contained vile, derogatory, and scandalous language, including questioning the Respondent’s legitimacy and making reprehensible allegations against his mother, were proved beyond doubt.”
The Bench held that specific messages, which included terms like “bastard,” “son of a bitch,” and suggestions that his mother should “earn through prostitution,” were “by themselves sufficient to constitute mental cruelty of the gravest kind.”
The Court dismissed the wife’s explanation that the husband might have sent the messages to himself from her phone as “inherently improbable” and an “afterthought,” noting this defence was never raised in her written statement.
The judgment also took into account other incidents, including the wife slapping the husband, her refusal of conjugal relations, and forcing the husband’s parents to leave the matrimonial home. The Court concluded that these incidents, taken together, “formed a pattern of repetitive and escalating hostility.”
Regarding the wife’s counter-allegations of cruelty, including harassment through litigation, the High Court concurred with the Family Court’s observation that while the husband’s conduct was “not entirely desirable,” it could not justify the wife’s own misconduct. The Bench remarked, “Two wrongs do not make a right. The Appellant’s proven acts of cruelty… stand on their own footing and are severe enough to warrant the dissolution of the marriage.”
On the Plea of Condonation:
The Court rejected the wife’s argument that the husband had condoned the cruelty by cohabiting with her after filing for divorce. It found that the wife failed to provide any material evidence to substantiate her claim of cohabitation. Furthermore, the Court noted that the wife’s own conduct, including her express statement before the Family Court that she would only accept a divorce upon payment of Rs. 50 lakhs, demonstrated no genuine intent to revive the marriage.
On the Claim for Permanent Alimony:
The High Court decisively rejected the wife’s prayer for permanent alimony under Section 25 of the Hindu Marriage Act. The judgment emphasized that the wife is a Group ‘A’ officer in the IRTS, holding a senior position with a “regular and substantial salary along with numerous allowances and service benefits.”
The Court observed that there was no evidence of financial hardship or dependency that would justify an award of alimony. It laid down the principle that permanent alimony is a “measure of social justice and not as a tool for enrichment or equalizing the financial status of two capable individuals.”
The judgment stated, “It is an undisputed fact that the Appellant, being a Group ‘A’ officer, holds a senior and responsible position in the Government of India… The material on record does not disclose any evidence of financial hardship, dependency, or extraordinary circumstances that would render her incapable of maintaining herself with dignity.”
Considering the short duration of cohabitation (about one year), the absence of children, and the wife’s financial independence, the Court found her claim for alimony to be unsustainable.
Finding no merit in the appeal, the High Court dismissed it, thereby confirming the decree of divorce granted by the Family Court.
