The Supreme Court of India has set aside the termination of three Intermediate Trained Teachers from Jharkhand, ruling that the state’s decision was “highhanded, arbitrary and illegal.” A bench comprising Justice Dipankar Datta and Justice K.V. Viswanathan held that the termination orders were vitiated by a gross violation of the principles of natural justice and a misapplication of the state’s appointment rules. The Court found that the Department of Education had unlawfully excluded marks obtained in vocational subjects to declare the teachers ineligible, a ground that was never mentioned in the original show-cause notices.
The judgment restores the services of two appellants, Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom, with full back pay and seniority. For the third appellant, Surendra Munda, who passed away during the litigation, the Court ordered that he be deemed to have died in service and granted his heirs full arrears of pay and the right to apply for compassionate employment.
Background of the Case
The matter originated from the appointment of Ravi Oraon, Premlal Hembrom, and Surendra Munda as Intermediate Trained Teachers (Classes I to V) in Dhanbad district in December 2015. Nearly a year later, on September 27, 2016, they were issued show-cause notices alleging they did not meet the eligibility criterion of securing a minimum of 45% marks in their intermediate (Class XII) examination. The notices also questioned the validity of their graduation certificates.
In their replies, the appellants contended that as members of the Scheduled Tribe category, they were entitled to a 5% relaxation, requiring them to secure only 40% marks, not 45%. They asserted that they had secured 42.55%, 40.22%, and 41.33% respectively, thus meeting the required standard. They also clarified that a graduation certificate was not a prerequisite for the post and was submitted only for completeness.
However, on October 7, 2016, their services were terminated. The termination orders cited a new reason: the teachers had secured less than 40% in their intermediate exams. The Department arrived at this conclusion by excluding the marks the appellants had obtained in their vocational subjects. According to the Department’s calculation, the appellants’ scores were 38.56%, 39.78%, and 39%, respectively.
The teachers challenged their termination before the Jharkhand High Court. A Single Judge allowed their writ petitions and quashed the termination orders. However, the State of Jharkhand filed intra-court appeals, and a Division Bench of the High Court reversed the Single Judge’s decision, upholding the terminations. Aggrieved by this, the appellants moved the Supreme Court.
Arguments Before the Supreme Court
The appellants argued that the calculation of their percentage should have included the bonus marks from their vocational subjects, as per the regulations printed on their own marksheets. They contended that Rule 21 of the Jharkhand Primary School Teacher Appointment Rules, 2012, which the state relied on to exclude these marks, was applicable only for preparing the merit list and not for determining a candidate’s basic eligibility.
Crucially, they argued their termination was a violation of natural justice, as the ground for termination—the exclusion of vocational subject marks—was never part of the original show-cause notice. They were thus denied an opportunity to defend themselves against this specific allegation.
The State of Jharkhand, represented by the respondents, defended the termination by citing Rule 21A(ii)(A) of the 2012 Rules, which states that “marks obtained in additional subject shall not be included” for determining the “educational merit point.” The Division Bench of the High Court had accepted this argument, stating there was “no requirement to follow the principle of natural justice when the fact is not in dispute.”
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Findings
The Supreme Court conducted a detailed analysis of the 2012 Rules and the principles of natural justice to arrive at its decision.
1. Misapplication of Rule 21 for Determining Eligibility
Justice Datta, writing for the bench, observed that the state’s reliance on Rule 21 suffered from a “prodigious error.” The Court pointed out that the 2012 Rules are divided into distinct chapters. Rule 4, which governs the eligibility to appear in the Teacher Eligibility Test (TET), falls under Chapter 2 (“Teacher Eligibility Test”). Rule 21, on the other hand, falls under Chapter 3 (“Appointment”) and its heading explicitly states it is for the “preparation of Merit List.”
The judgment held: “The eligibility of a candidate for appearing in the Teacher Eligibility Test is to be decided in accordance with Rule 4 and Merit list (for the purposes of appointment) is to be prepared in accordance with Rule 21. Thus, the respondents erred in applying Rule 21 for the purpose of deciding whether the appellants fulfilled the eligibility criteria.”
The Court noted that Rule 4 does not provide for the exclusion of marks from a vocational subject. Therefore, the only valid method for calculation was the one provided on the marksheets, according to which the appellants had secured more than the required 40% marks.
2. Gross Violation of Principles of Natural Justice
The Court expressed deep concern over the procedure followed by the state, describing it as a “course of action which shocks our conscience.” The judgment highlighted that the appellants had successfully defended the allegation in the show-cause notice (i.e., failing to secure 45%). The state then terminated them on a completely different ground—failing to secure 40% after excluding vocational marks—which was never put to them.
The Court held: “The findings were returned by the respondents which were at variance with the allegations levelled in the show-cause notices. The appellants having successfully defended the allegations, the respondents were precluded in law from proceeding with such notices.”
The Court stated that in the absence of a fresh show-cause notice, the appellants were denied a fair and reasonable opportunity of hearing, rendering the termination orders “wholly unsustainable and stand vitiated.” It also rejected the Division Bench’s reasoning that natural justice was not required, stating that compliance would not have been an “idle formality” as the appellants could have pointed out the error in applying Rule 21.
The Final Decision and Relief
Based on these findings, the Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the Division Bench’s judgments.
- The termination orders were quashed.
- Appellants Ravi Oraon and Premlal Hembrom shall be treated as being in continuous service from their original appointment date in December 2015. They are entitled to full arrears of pay and seniority. However, the period of absence will not count towards experience for promotion, as “practical experience of teaching is gained through imparting of lessons to the students.”
- For appellant Surendra Munda, who passed away on August 5, 2024, the Court ordered that he shall be deemed to have died-in-harness. His heirs are entitled to full arrears of pay from the date of termination until his death. The Court further directed that his heirs may apply for compassionate employment, and the respondents shall consider such an application on its merits.
- All arrears are to be disbursed within three months.
