The Allahabad High Court recently quashed criminal proceedings initiated under the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, holding that a Village Development Officer/Village Secretary is not a “revenue authority” and is therefore not competent to initiate such action. The ruling came from a single-judge bench of Justice Saurabh Srivastava, who set aside a cognizance order and chargesheet against two individuals, Lal Bahadur and another, stating that the prescribed legal procedure under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006, must be followed.
Case Background
The case originated from an FIR registered as Case Crime No. 112 of 2023 at Police Station Utraon, District Prayagraj. The FIR was lodged by the Village Development Officer/Village Secretary (Opposite Party No. 2) based on a complaint from the Gram Pradhan. The allegation was that the applicants, Lal Bahadur and another, had damaged a public drainage situated on plot no. 136.
Following an investigation, a chargesheet (No. 1/2023) was filed on October 5, 2023. Subsequently, the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Allahabad, took cognizance of the offence under Sections 3/5 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984, by an order dated June 13, 2024. The applicants challenged the entire proceedings, including the chargesheet and the cognizance order, by filing an application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Cr.P.C.).
Arguments of the Parties
The counsel for the applicants, Sri Ambleshwar Pandey, challenged the proceedings on four primary grounds:
- Competence of the Informant: It was argued that the Village Development Officer/Village Secretary was not empowered to initiate proceedings related to damage to public property. Such grievances, the counsel contended, should be raised by the Gram Pradhan through the Land Management Committee to the concerned revenue authorities.
- Procedural Irregularity: The applicants asserted that the correct procedure is laid down in Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. This provision mandates issuing a notice to the alleged encroacher, allowing them to file objections. The counsel argued that by lodging an FIR, the incompetent informant had bypassed this established legal framework.
- Error in Cognizance: The applicants submitted that the Magistrate erred in taking cognizance without examining the competence of the informant or verifying the revenue records to confirm the facts.
- Discrepancy in Revenue Records: The counsel drew the Court’s attention to the revenue records (khatauni), which described plot no. 136 as a public “pathway along with pond.” It was argued that, based on this official record, the destruction of a drainage on that plot was not possible, suggesting the litigation was unwarranted.
The learned Additional Government Advocate (A.G.A.), representing the State, countered that there was a “possibility that drainage has been altogether available along with the pathway” on the plot in question.
Court’s Analysis and Decision
After hearing the submissions, Justice Saurabh Srivastava found the arguments presented by the applicants’ counsel to be “quite convincing.” The Court held that the authority to act in cases of damage or encroachment on public property is vested exclusively with the revenue authorities as defined under the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006.
The judgment explicitly states, “…the informant being opposite party no. 2 was not at all entitled and having any right conferred by the statute available under the Act of 1984 as well as the Code of 2006, if in any case, any public property is being caused to be damaged or damaged in shape of encroachment possession or destruction, the same shall be ensued at the behest of the revenue authorities is only the person authorized by the competent revenue authorities.”
The Court unequivocally declared, “It is crystal clear that the Village Development Officer/Village Secretary does not come under the ambit of the revenue authorities.”
Furthermore, the bench affirmed that Section 67 of the Revenue Code outlines the specific procedure for such matters and cited a coordinate bench’s order in Munshi Lal and Another vs. State of U.P. and another (Application u/s 482 no. 9964 of 2020) which upheld the same legal position.
In light of these findings, the Court concluded that the proceedings were initiated without legal authority.
“In view of the aforementioned facts and circumstances,” the Court ordered, “the entire proceedings of Case No. 1127 of 2024 arising out of Case Crime No. 112 of 2023… as well as the impugned cognizance order dated 13.06.2024 and chargesheet no. 1/2023 dated 05.10.2023, are hereby set-aside.”
Consequently, the application filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was allowed.
