The Supreme Court of India, in a significant judgment, has held that administrative actions taken against an employee, which are not directly connected to previous incidents of sexual misconduct, cannot be treated as a “continuing wrong” to extend the statutory limitation period for filing a complaint under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (POSH Act).
While dismissing an appeal on the grounds of limitation, a bench comprising Justice Pankaj Mithal and Justice Prasanna B. Varale made a unique and trenchant observation, directing that its judgment be made a permanent part of the respondent’s resume. The Court stated, “It is advisable to forgive the wrongdoer, but not to forget the wrongdoing.”
The decision came in an appeal filed by a faculty member at the West Bengal National University of Juridical Sciences (NUJS), challenging a Calcutta High Court Division Bench order that had dismissed her sexual harassment complaint against the university’s Vice-Chancellor as being barred by time.
Case Background
The appellant lodged a formal complaint with the Local Complaint Committee (LCC) on December 26, 2023, alleging sexual harassment by the Vice-Chancellor, who was appointed to the position on July 3, 2019.
The LCC rejected her complaint, ruling that it was filed beyond the prescribed limitation period. The committee noted that the last alleged incident of sexual harassment occurred in April 2023, while the complaint was filed over eight months later, exceeding both the initial three-month and the maximum extendable six-month limitation period under Section 9 of the POSH Act.
Aggrieved by this, the appellant approached the Calcutta High Court. A single Judge bench allowed her writ petition, quashing the LCC’s order. The Judge held that the Vice-Chancellor had created an “intimidating, offensive and hostile work environment” for the appellant even after April 2023, which constituted a continuing act of sexual harassment, thus bringing her complaint within the permissible time frame.
However, a Division Bench of the High Court overturned the single Judge’s order. It concluded that the administrative actions taken against the appellant after April 2023 were “collective decisions of the Executive Council” and not the personal actions of the Vice-Chancellor. The Division Bench restored the LCC’s decision, finding the complaint to be time-barred. This led to the present appeal before the Supreme Court.
The Court’s Analysis
The Supreme Court framed the central issue as whether the Division Bench was justified in non-suiting the appellant on the ground that her complaint was barred by limitation.
The bench, led by Justice Mithal, began its analysis by examining the definitions of ‘sexual harassment’ under Section 2(n) and the circumstances constituting it under Section 3 of the POSH Act. The Court observed that the law covers not only direct physical or verbal acts of a sexual nature but also circumstances like an “implied or explicit threat of detrimental treatment in her employment” or “creating an intimidating or offensive or hostile work environment for her.”
Reviewing the appellant’s complaint, the Court noted the specific allegations:
- In September 2019, the Vice-Chancellor allegedly insisted she accompany him for dinner and touched her hand, making her uncomfortable.
- In October 2019, he allegedly demanded sexual favours and threatened her if she declined.
- The last direct incident was in April 2023, when he allegedly asked her to accompany him on a trip to a resort, which she refused, and he threatened that her “career would suffer badly.”
The complaint also detailed subsequent events, including her removal from the post of Director of a research centre on August 29, 2023, and the initiation of a preliminary inquiry against her by the Executive Council.
The crucial question for the Court was whether these subsequent administrative actions were “linked to sexual harassment or amount to sexual harassment” under the POSH Act. The Court found they were not. It held:
“The actions taken against the appellant in August 2023, are administrative in nature and does not create a gender based hostile environment, and hence, fall short of being actions amounting to acts of sexual harassment.”
The judgment emphasized the necessity of a direct link, stating, “The use of the… expression ‘in relation to’ or ‘connected with’ used in Section 3(2) of the Act… clearly demonstrates that there has to be a direct link between the action complained of and an overt act of sexual harassment.” The Court found “no such direct link” between the April 2023 incident and the subsequent administrative decisions.
The Court reasoned that the appellant’s removal as Director arose from a complaint by an external governance body regarding a project report, and the inquiry into project funds was a “collective decision” of the Executive Council, not a “unilateral action of the Vice-Chancellor.”
Distinguishing between a “continuing wrong” and a “recurring wrong,” the Court held that the “alleged act of harassment of April 2023, was a complete act in itself and had not continued thereafter.”
The Court also noted that the appellant, by filing an application for condonation of delay, was herself “conscious of the fact that her complaint was delayed,” indicating that she treated the April 2023 incident as the last act of harassment.
Final Decision and Direction
Based on its analysis, the Supreme Court concluded that the Division Bench of the High Court “committed no error of law in restoring the decision of the LCC that the complaint of the appellant is time barred and is liable to be dismissed.”
However, in a remarkable conclusion, the Court added a powerful rider to its dismissal. Acknowledging the substance of the allegations despite the technical ground for dismissal, the Court ordered:
“The wrong which has been committed against the appellant may not be investigated on technical grounds, but it must not be forgotten. In this view of the matter, we direct that the incidents of alleged sexual harassment on part of respondent no.1 may be forgiven but allowed to haunt the wrongdoer forever. Thus, it is directed that this judgment shall be made part of the resume of respondent no.1, compliance of which shall be strictly ensured by him personally.”
The appeal was dismissed with these observations.
