The Supreme Court of India, in a recent judgment, has ruled that a request to correct an employee’s date of birth in service records after an inordinate delay of 25 years is not permissible, particularly when the claim leads to glaring factual impossibilities regarding the employee’s family status at the time of joining service. The Court set aside a Jharkhand High Court Division Bench order that had allowed a workman to change his date of birth from 1960 to 1972.
The bench, comprising Justice Vikram Nath and Justice Sandeep Mehta, was hearing an appeal filed by the Employer in relation to the Management of Katras Area of M/s Bharat Coking Coal Limited, Dhanbad, against their workman, Shahdeo Das. The Supreme Court restored the order of a Single Judge of the High Court, which had quashed an award by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal (CGIT) that permitted the change.
Background of the Case
The workman, Shahdeo Das, joined the services of Bharat Coking Coal Limited on September 24, 1990. At the time of his appointment, his date of birth was recorded as September 18, 1960, in the service book based on a declaration made by Mr. Das himself. The service book also documented details of his dependents, which included his wife, Smt. Keshari Devi (aged 24), four daughters aged between 6 months and 6 years, and his father. The judgment notes that the service book bears the signature of Mr. Das, dated June 17, 1992.
For 25 years, Mr. Das did not raise any objection to the recorded date of birth. However, in October/November 2015, he applied for a correction, requesting his date of birth be changed to January 5, 1972. This claim was based on a Transfer/School Leaving Certificate issued on November 5, 2015, which he stated was from his matriculation examination.
The employer rejected the request, leading to an industrial dispute. The CGIT, Dhanbad, in an award dated September 30, 2020, allowed the reference and directed the correction.
High Court Proceedings
The employer challenged the CGIT’s award before the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi. A Single Judge, after appreciating the facts and law, allowed the employer’s writ petition on October 28, 2021. The Single Judge relied on previous Supreme Court judgments, including Bharat Coking Coal Limited & Others vs. Shyam Kishore Singh, to conclude that “applying for correction of date of birth after a delay of 25 years almost towards the end of service, is not to be permitted.”
Mr. Das then filed a Letters Patent Appeal against the Single Judge’s order. A Division Bench of the High Court, by its judgment on September 6, 2023, allowed the appeal, set aside the Single Judge’s order, and restored the CGIT’s award. The Division Bench reasoned that the High Court in its writ jurisdiction should not have interfered with a finding of the CGIT based on an appreciation of evidence, and noted that the school leaving certificate was not challenged by the employer.
Supreme Court’s Analysis and Decision
The Supreme Court, hearing the employer’s appeal, disagreed with the Division Bench’s reasoning. The bench stated, “we are in agreement with the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge that a claim for correction of date of birth after a delay of 25 years, ought not to be entertained.”
The Court found a critical and undisputed inconsistency in the workman’s claim. It observed that if the workman’s date of birth was taken as January 5, 1972, he would have been only 18 years old when he joined service in 1990. The Court made a pointed observation on this matter: “Difficult almost impossible to have a wife aged 24 years and four daughters aged between 6 months to 6 years.”
Furthermore, the Supreme Court questioned the authenticity and timing of the school leaving certificate. The judgment noted that the certificate, supposedly from 1987, was issued only on November 5, 2015, nearly 28 years after Mr. Das allegedly left school. The Court stated, “if the respondent had actually studied in matriculation and there was a Transfer Certificate/School Leaving Certificate of 1987, the same ought to have been filed either at the time of joining or at any time soon thereafter.”
The Court also emphasized that Mr. Das had signed his service book in 1992, which contained the original date of birth, and he had provided no evidence to show that an incorrect date had been recorded due to someone else’s negligence.
Concluding that the Division Bench had erred, the Supreme Court allowed the employer’s appeal. The judgment of the Division Bench was set aside, and the order of the Single Judge, which rejected the workman’s claim for correction, was confirmed.
