The Madhya Pradesh High Court has upheld the dismissal of Kaustubh Khera, a Civil Judge (Junior Division), who challenged his discharge from service after being accused of various acts of judicial and administrative impropriety — including forcing lawyers and police personnel to perform sit-ups in open court as a form of apology. The court ruled that the discharge was a lawful administrative decision during probation and not a punitive termination.
The Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Suresh Kumar Kait and Justice Vivek Jain dismissed Khera’s writ petition (WP No. 10052 of 2025), holding that the decision of the High Court’s Administrative Committee and Full Court to discharge him under Rule 11(c) of the M.P. Judicial Service (Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1994, did not violate any legal or constitutional provisions.
Background
Kaustubh Khera was appointed to the Madhya Pradesh Judicial Service on March 12, 2019, as a probationer and later posted at Jobat, District Alirajpur. His probation extended beyond the maximum three-year period, and he was discharged from service by the State Government on September 5, 2024, following recommendations from the High Court’s Administrative Committee dated August 8, 2024, and subsequent ratification by the Full Court on August 20, 2024.
The discharge order cited his failure to satisfactorily complete the probation period. The petitioner argued that this discharge was punitive in nature and violated the principles of natural justice.
Petitioner’s Arguments
Kaustubh Khera, appearing in person, contended that although the order was framed as a discharge simpliciter, it was in effect a punitive order based on alleged misconduct. He submitted that the decision was founded on several complaints made against him, the contents of which he obtained under the Right to Information Act and submitted as Annexure P/21.
Among the allegations were:
- Misbehavior with advocates, police personnel, and court staff.
- Initiation and subsequent closure of contempt of court proceedings without proper authority.
- Forcing members of the Bar and police officers to perform sit-ups and apologize in open court.
- Verbally abusing female court staff and attempting to physically assault them.
- Leaving the court headquarters without permission.
- Imposing imprisonment and fines on court staff beyond his legal authority.
Khera relied on a preliminary inquiry report conducted by District Judge Nadeem Khan, which he obtained under RTI, and which, he claimed, substantiated the complaints. He argued that since no departmental inquiry was conducted, the discharge order violated natural justice.
He further argued that his ACRs reflected good performance in some years, with “B” grades (Very Good) in 2019 and 2023, and that his disposal units had improved significantly. He claimed he had been on probation for over five years without formal extension and that his services should be deemed confirmed under Rule 11(d). He also cited the recruitment advertisement, which mentioned a one-month notice period prior to discharge — a requirement he claimed was not met.
Respondents’ Arguments
Senior Advocate Aditya Adhikari, representing the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, argued that the discharge order was not punitive and did not involve any allegations of misconduct in its text or accompanying resolutions. He asserted that the decision was based solely on a finding that Khera had not satisfactorily completed his probation and would not shape into a suitable judicial officer.
The learned counsel acknowledged that complaints had been received and a discrete inquiry was conducted. However, he emphasized that no formal inquiry or charge sheet followed because the decision to discharge was not based on proven misconduct. The material was only used to assess Khera’s overall suitability for confirmation, which, under settled law, does not require adherence to the principles of natural justice.
He further submitted that consideration of adverse ACRs and service records is permissible during probation and that such consideration does not convert a discharge into a punitive action. He rejected the petitioner’s claims about deemed confirmation and the need for notice, citing statutory rules that override recruitment advertisements.
Court’s Analysis
The Bench held that the discharge was an administrative decision taken under Rule 11(c) of the 1994 Rules and was not motivated by the misconduct alleged in the complaints. The court stated:
“It cannot be said that a punitive action has been taken… The action to discharge the officer simply is not an action which is founded on misconduct or motivated on misconduct.”
The court examined the ACRs from 2020 to 2023, which showed a pattern of average performance, including poor quality of judgments, lack of interest in civil matters, and negative interpersonal behavior. It noted that uncommunicated ACR entries can be validly considered when assessing probationers’ suitability, citing Rajesh Kumar Srivastava v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 4 SCC 447.
Regarding the petitioner’s claim of automatic confirmation after three years, the court referred to Rule 11(d), holding that confirmation requires a formal finding of successful probation and suitability — neither of which were made in this case.
The court concluded:
“The petitioner was unable to establish… that the Administrative Committee or Full Court have taken into consideration the allegations as the foundation of the decision. The discharge order simpliciter mentions that the petitioner was unable to carry out the probation period satisfactorily and successfully.”
Final Judgment
Dismissing the writ petition, the Bench held:
“In view of Rule 11(c)… we find no reason to interfere in the impugned order. The petition being devoid of merits, deserves to be and stands dismissed.”
