The Supreme Court of India, in its recent ruling in Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of Gujarat, has reaffirmed its stance on the necessity of a preliminary inquiry before registering a First Information Report (FIR). The court dismissed the appeal of former IAS officer Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma, who sought a writ of mandamus directing authorities to conduct a preliminary inquiry before lodging an FIR against him for acts performed in his official capacity.
Background of the Case
The appellant, Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma, served as the Collector of Kachchh District, Gujarat, between 2003 and 2006. Multiple FIRs were registered against him for alleged irregularities in land allotments during his tenure. These charges primarily related to abuse of official position, corrupt practices, and financial misconduct.
Sharma contended that successive FIRs were being filed against him without a preliminary inquiry, violating his fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The appellant cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2014) 2 SCC 1, arguing that a preliminary inquiry was mandatory before lodging FIRs in such cases.
The Gujarat High Court had earlier dismissed his petition, holding that once a cognizable offence is disclosed, the police have a statutory obligation to register an FIR under Section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC). Aggrieved by this decision, Sharma approached the Supreme Court.
Key Legal Issues
The central issues before the Supreme Court were:
Whether the authorities were required to conduct a preliminary inquiry before lodging FIRs against a retired IAS officer for alleged corruption and abuse of office.
Whether the successive registration of FIRs against the appellant constituted an abuse of legal process.
Whether the Lalita Kumari judgment mandated a preliminary inquiry in all cases concerning abuse of official position.
Supreme Court’s Decision
A division bench comprising Justices Vikram Nath and Prasanna B. Varale dismissed Sharma’s appeal, affirming that a preliminary inquiry is not mandatory when allegations clearly disclose a cognizable offence.
Citing Lalita Kumari, the bench observed:
“The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154 of the Code if the information discloses commission of a cognizable offence, and no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a situation.”
The court emphasized that Lalita Kumari allows preliminary inquiries only in specific cases where doubt exists as to whether the allegations constitute a cognizable offence. These categories include family disputes, commercial transactions, and medical negligence. However, in cases involving corruption and abuse of power by public officials, the requirement of a preliminary inquiry does not arise.
Rejecting the appellant’s plea, the court held:
“Granting a blanket direction for preliminary inquiry in all cases involving the appellant would amount to judicial legislation, which is impermissible.”
The court further noted that the appellant had adequate legal remedies, including seeking the quashing of frivolous FIRs under Section 482 CrPC and applying for anticipatory bail. It also ruled that courts cannot rewrite statutory provisions by introducing additional procedural safeguards not contemplated under the law.
Arguments Presented
For the Appellant: Senior advocate Kapil Sibal argued that successive FIRs had been filed against Sharma as a form of harassment, particularly after securing bail in previous cases. He contended that the State was misusing its authority to ensure his continued incarceration. He emphasized that a preliminary inquiry should be required before further FIRs were registered.
For the Respondents: Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, appearing for the State of Gujarat, countered that a preliminary inquiry is not legally required in corruption cases. He contended that allowing such a requirement would create an undue advantage for public officials accused of wrongdoing and hinder criminal investigations. He further argued that the appellant’s plea, if granted, would set a dangerous precedent, permitting accused officials to evade investigation.
