The Allahabad High Court has ruled in favor of a batch of former probationary judicial officers whose services were terminated, holding that their discharge orders were not merely simpliciter but carried a stigmatic effect, warranting procedural safeguards. The judgment, delivered by a division bench comprising Justice Jaspreet Singh, Justice Manish Mathur, and Justice Subhash Vidyarthi, underscores the principle that probationary judicial officers, like any other public servants, have a fundamental right to be treated fairly under Article 14 of the Constitution.
Background of the Case
The petitioners, who were serving as probationary judicial officers, were discharged from service by an administrative decision of the Full Court of the Allahabad High Court. The discharge orders, passed under Rule 24(4) of the U.P. Judicial Service Rules, 2001, were stated to be simpliciter, meaning they did not impute misconduct directly. However, the termination followed an inquiry into an alleged altercation involving the officers at a private gathering.
Legal Issues Involved
Nature of Termination: The core issue before the court was whether the discharge orders were genuinely termination simpliciter based on unsuitability or whether they were punitive in nature.
Applicability of Article 311(2) of the Constitution: The petitioners argued that since their termination was based on misconduct allegations, they were entitled to a fair hearing and an inquiry under Article 311(2), which provides safeguards against arbitrary dismissal.
Judicial Review Scope: The court also examined whether it had the authority to assess the decision-making process of the Full Court, given the constraints on judicial review in administrative decisions.
Court’s Decision and Key Observations
The Allahabad High Court, in a detailed judgment, ruled that the termination orders were indeed punitive and not mere discharge simpliciter. The court observed:
“This Court would be failing in its duty if the veil is not lifted and the actual reason for passing the discharge order is not explored merely on a general proposition that the conduct of a judge must be exemplary. Fundamental rights of a person being protected from arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution apply with the same rigour to judges as to ordinary citizens.”
The court held that while the termination orders did not explicitly mention misconduct, the underlying administrative records and inquiry reports clearly pointed towards allegations that cast aspersions on the officers’ integrity and suitability. Consequently, the termination orders could not escape the requirement of an inquiry and procedural fairness.
The bench highlighted that the termination orders were solely based on an incident of an altercation at a private event, without a formal disciplinary inquiry or any assessment of the overall performance of the petitioners during their probation period. It noted that the Full Court’s resolution recommending the termination of the probationers relied primarily on the inquiry report dated September 12, 2014, which described the altercation but did not establish individual culpability or misconduct in an official capacity.
Furthermore, the court emphasized that the discharge orders did not evaluate the judicial competence or work records of the petitioners, which is a crucial factor in determining the suitability of a probationary officer for confirmation. Instead, the orders appeared to be punitive in nature as they were rooted in an incident unrelated to the judicial performance of the officers.
The ruling cited several Supreme Court precedents, reinforcing that if an order of termination is based on allegations of misconduct, even if not explicitly mentioned in the order, it amounts to a punitive action and requires compliance with the principles of natural justice. The court reiterated that lifting the veil on administrative decisions is necessary when a seemingly innocuous order has underlying punitive intent.
