The Rajasthan High Court has dismissed a writ petition challenging the appointment of Shri Padmesh Mishra as Additional Advocate General (AAG) for the Government of Rajasthan. The petitioner, Advocate Sunil Samdaria, contested the appointment, alleging a violation of the Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018. The High Court, in a detailed ruling, upheld the government’s authority to amend its litigation policy and appoint legal officers as per its discretion.
Background of the Case
The petitioner, Advocate Sunil Samdaria, filed a writ petition (S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 14130/2024) under Article 226 of the Constitution, challenging the appointment of Padmesh Mishra as AAG through a government order dated August 23, 2024. Samdaria argued that Mishra lacked the mandatory ten years of legal practice required under Clause 14.4 of the Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018. He also alleged that Clause 14.8, which was incorporated into the policy on the same date, was inserted arbitrarily to facilitate Mishra’s appointment.
Legal Issues
The primary legal issues in the case revolved around:
Eligibility Criteria: Whether the appointment of an AAG requires a mandatory ten years of legal experience as per Clause 14.4 of the Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018.
Government’s Power to Amend Policy: Whether the insertion of Clause 14.8 in the policy, allowing the appointment of any counsel based on expertise, was arbitrary.
Nature of the Post of Additional Advocate General: Whether the AAG holds a “public office,” making the appointment subject to judicial review under a writ of quo warranto.
Consultation with Advocate General: Whether the appointment required the effective consultation of the Advocate General, as per Clause 14.2 of the policy.
Arguments of the Parties
The appointment was made in violation of Clause 14.4, which required a minimum of ten years of practice.
Clause 14.8 was inserted arbitrarily and in a hasty manner to accommodate the appointment of Mishra.
The appointment was not made in effective consultation with the Advocate General, as required by the policy.
The decision was contrary to the Supreme Court’s ruling in State of Punjab v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal [(2016) 6 SCC 1], which emphasized fair and objective criteria in the appointment of law officers.
Respondents’ Defense
The state government has the discretion to appoint legal officers and modify eligibility criteria as per administrative necessity.
Clause 14.4 was not an absolute requirement, as it allowed the government to prescribe different criteria.
The insertion of Clause 14.8 was approved by the Cabinet, making it a valid policy decision.
The appointment of an AAG is a contractual engagement, not a civil post, and thus is not subject to a writ of quo warranto.
Court’s Ruling
Justice Sudesh Bansal, while dismissing the petition, made several key observations:
State’s Discretion in Appointments:
“The choice of eligibility criteria is left to the exclusive domain of the employer, and the courts do not examine eligibility criteria with a perspective that more suitable or better criteria could have been adopted by the employer.”
The government retains the power to alter eligibility norms and has the authority to appoint legal officers based on its needs.
Quo Warranto Not Maintainable:
“The post of Additional Advocate General is not a civil or public post, but a contractual engagement.”
A writ of quo warranto cannot be issued against the appointment of a law officer whose selection is based on executive discretion.
No Arbitrariness in Clause 14.8 Amendment:
“The sequence of events may be a coincidence, but cannot be made a basis to draw an assumption of arbitrariness, bias, or colorable exercise of power.”
The policy amendment was a valid executive action, duly approved by the Cabinet.
Supreme Court’s Precedents Support Government Discretion:
The court relied on State of U.P. v. Johri Mal [(2004) 4 SCC 714], which upheld the state’s right to appoint law officers based on its discretion.
The Supreme Court’s ruling in Census Commissioner v. R. Krishnamurthy [(2015) 2 SCC 796] was cited, stating that courts should not interfere in policy decisions unless they are “capricious, arbitrary, or in violation of fundamental rights.”
Rejection of Petitioner’s Reliance on Brijeshwar Singh Chahal Case:
The court distinguished the present case from State of Punjab v. Brijeshwar Singh Chahal [(2016) 6 SCC 1], noting that the latter dealt with the issue of mass appointments without objective criteria. In contrast, the Rajasthan government had followed a structured decision-making process in amending its policy.
Final Verdict
The High Court dismissed the petition, ruling that the State Government’s discretion in appointing law officers cannot be curtailed unless there is proven arbitrariness or malafide intent. The court refused to interfere in the government’s policy decision and held that Clause 14.8 was valid.
Key Takeaways
The government has wide discretion in appointing legal officers and can alter eligibility criteria.
A quo warranto petition is not maintainable against appointments to contractual government posts.
The court will not intervene in policy decisions unless there is clear evidence of arbitrariness.
The appointment of young and capable advocates is within the state’s policy-making power.
Despite dismissing the case, the court appreciated the petitioner’s efforts, stating, “Although the petitioner has not succeeded on merits, his bona fide attempt to challenge the appointment deserves appreciation.”
