In a notable ruling, the Supreme Court of India has clarified the extent of protection afforded to witnesses under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Court held that the qualified privilege granted under this provision does not provide complete immunity from prosecution if there is additional evidence beyond the witness’s own incriminating statements. The Court ruled that the power under Section 319 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC) can be exercised to summon such a witness as an accused if further material evidence exists.
This judgment came in the case of Raghuveer Sharan vs. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 2764 of 2024), where the appellant, Raghuveer Sharan, sought to overturn an order summoning him as an accused under Section 319 CrPC. The bench, comprising Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale, upheld the High Court’s decision and provided a nuanced interpretation of the interplay between Sections 132 and 319 of the relevant statutes.
Background of the Case
The origins of the case date back to 1998, involving allegations of forgery and fraud. The controversy arose when Savitri Shyam, then President of Shyam Sunder Shyam Sansthan, deposited INR 10,00,000 in the form of two separate fixed deposits with the District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank, Datia, Madhya Pradesh. The deposits were initially for a tenure of three years. However, it was alleged that the tenure was illicitly extended first to ten years and subsequently to fifteen years by making interpolations and forgery under the initials of the appellant, Raghuveer Sharan, who was the bank’s cashier at the time.
A criminal complaint was filed against the accused, and during the investigation, the appellant was examined as a witness. In his pre-summoning statement recorded on March 19, 2016, the appellant admitted to changing the tenure of the fixed deposits. Later, during the trial, PW-1, Narendra Singh Parmar, testified that the appellant was responsible for the alterations. This led the bank to file an application under Section 319 CrPC, seeking to array the appellant and another individual, Rakesh Bharti, as additional accused.
The Special Court (MP/MLA), Gwalior, partly allowed the application, summoning the appellant while rejecting the inclusion of Rakesh Bharti. The appellant’s subsequent appeal to the Madhya Pradesh High Court was dismissed, leading to the current appeal before the Supreme Court.
Key Legal Issues and Arguments
Before the Supreme Court, the core issue was whether the appellant could seek immunity under Section 132 of the Indian Evidence Act, which prevents a witness from being prosecuted solely on their self-incriminating statements made during testimony.
Arguments by the Appellant:
Mr. Vivek K. Tankha, the senior counsel for the appellant, argued that Section 132 of the Evidence Act provided a complete shield against prosecution for statements made by a witness. He contended that the appellant, having made self-incriminating statements under compulsion, should be immune from prosecution, and there was no prima facie case warranting his summoning as an accused under Section 319 CrPC.
Arguments by the Respondent:
Contrarily, Mr. Saurabh Mishra, representing the respondent bank, argued that the appellant was summoned not merely based on his pre-summoning statement but based on additional evidence, specifically the testimony of PW-1 recorded during the trial on March 31, 2022. He asserted that Section 132 does not apply when there is further material evidence beyond the witness’s own statements, supporting the invocation of Section 319 CrPC.
Court’s Observations and Judgment
Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra, delivering the judgment, emphasized that while Section 132 of the Evidence Act aims to encourage witnesses to testify truthfully without fear of self-incrimination, the protection it offers is not absolute. The Court observed:
“The qualified privilege under the proviso to Section 132 of the Act does not grant complete immunity from prosecution to a person who has deposed as a witness (and made statements incriminating himself). The privilege is limited and does not extend to instances where other substantial evidence or material against the witness is available.”
The Court further noted that the legislative intent behind Section 132 was to secure evidence from all possible sources to serve the ends of justice. It was not intended to provide a blanket shield for witnesses who could otherwise be complicit in the crime. Justice Mishra explained:
“If the privilege made available to a witness under the proviso to Section 132 of the Act is interpreted as a complete immunity, notwithstanding the availability of other evidence, it is capable of abuse. In a particular case, a dishonest Investigating Officer could cite a person as a witness in the report under Section 173 of the CrPC, being fully aware that there is incriminating material against such person.”
The judgment elaborated that if there is independent evidence beyond the witness’s self-incriminating statement, the trial court is not barred from invoking Section 319 CrPC to summon such a witness as an accused. The Court stated:
“There cannot be an absolute embargo on the Trial Court to initiate process under Section 319 CrPC merely because a person, who though appears to be complicit, has deposed as a witness. The finding to invoke Section 319 CrPC must be based on the evidence that has come up during the course of the trial. There must be additional, cogent material before the Trial Court apart from the statement of the witness.”
The Court highlighted that even if a witness has made a self-incriminating statement, this alone does not preclude further proceedings against them if independent material evidence exists. The ruling clarified:
“An order for initiation of process under Section 319 CrPC against a witness, who has deposed in the trial and has tendered evidence incriminating himself, would be tested on the anvil that whether only such incriminating statement has formed the basis of the order under Section 319 CrPC. At the same time, mere reference to such statement would not vitiate the order.”
Case Title: Raghuveer Sharan vs. District Sahakari Krishi Gramin Vikas Bank & Anr.
Case No.: Criminal Appeal No. 2764 of 2024 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3419 of 2024)
Bench: Justice Prashant Kumar Mishra and Justice Prasanna Bhalachandra Varale
